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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OSCAR PETERSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
CLAUDE ALKEMA and niRS. 
qLAUDE ALKEMA, his wife, 
Defendants and Resp'Ondents. 
BRIEF OF: APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
No. 7868 
This is an appeal from the order of the Honorable 
Charles G. Cowley, one of the judges of the District 
Court of Weber County, State of Utah, granting the de-
fendants' motion to dismiss the first and second counts 
of plaintiff's complaint, and also granting the defendants 
a summary judgment against plaintiff as to both first 
and second counts in said action. The court did not pre-
pare and file findings of fact or conclusions of law, the 
court having based its decision upon the pleadings, the 
depositions, and exhibits, and the arguments of counsel. 
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On September 8, 1951, the plaintiff filed the following 
complaint against the defendants: 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
I. 
"The defendants are residents of Weber 
County, State of Utah, and for all times herein 
mentioned were the owners and operators of a 
fruit farm at Pleasant View in Weber County, 
Utah. 
II. 
"On or about the 24th day of July, 1951, plain-
tiff was employed and working for the defend-
ants on their fruit farm at Pleasant View, Weber 
County, Utah, and at said time and place it became 
and was plaintiff's duty under his employment 
to pick fruit from various and sundry trees lo-
cated on said farm, which work necessitated the 
use of a three-legged ladder about ten feet in 
length furnished plaintiff by defendants for such 
use; that while plaintiff. was stationed near the 
top of said ladder picking apricots, the sidings of 
said ladder broke in three places, causing the 
ladder to collapse and fall, and plaintiff to fall 
to the ground and to suffer the~ serious personal 
injuries, damage and loss herein complained of. 
III. 
"The defendants were negligent, reckless, 
careless and heedless in the following particulars, 
to-wit: 
a. The defendants failed, neglected and re-
fused to furnish plaintiff safe tools and equipment 
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'vith \vhich to do the work normally, reasonably 
and necessarily required of him as an apricot-
picker, in that defendants furnished plain tiff a 
dangerous, unsafe, \Yeak and insufficient ladder. 
b. The defendants furnished plaintiff a 
dangerous, unsafe and insufficient ladder for his 
use in _picking apricots in this: That the sidings 
of said ladder were weak, defective and insecure 
and \vould not bear the weight of a normal and 
ordinary man. 
c. The defendants, during all the times men-
tioned herein, had the exclusive custody, control 
and management of their farm, and all the equip-
ment the-reon, including the ladder which broke 
and collapsed under plaintiff, and they are pos-
sessed of superior, if not exclusive, access to in-
formation concerning the. precise cause of the 
sudden, unusual and unexpected breaking and col-
lapsing of the ladder, which plaintiff was using 
and which caused the injuries, lo:ss and damage 
to him as herein alleged, and the unusual, sudden 
and unexpected breaking and collapsing of said 
ladder was an event of such nature as would not 
have occurred in the ordinary course of events 
had the defendants exercised ordinary and reason-
able care; and had the defendants exercised due 
and proper care in the use, management and con-
trol of their farm and the various implements, 
including the ladder situate thereon, the accident 
and occurrence herein described would not have 
happened, and the plaintiff would not have re-
ceived the injuries, loss and damage herein com-
plained of. 
IV. 
"The aforesaid acts of ne.gligence and care-
lessness on the part of defendants, combined and 
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concurring, were and are the direct and proxi-
mate cause of the injuries sustained by plaintiff 
as heT·ein set forth. 
v. 
"As the direct and proximate result of the 
negligent, careless and heedless conduct of the 
defendants, plaintiff was caused to and did sus-
tain the following grievous personal injuries, to-
wit: A Colles fracture of the right wrist with the 
articulating surface of the. radius at right angles 
to the long axis of the shaft and with a small 
amount of impaction of the fragments of the 
radius. 
VI. 
"As a result of the aforementioned injuries, 
plaintiff has suffered continuously 'Since the 24th 
day of July, 1951, from pain, stiffness and sore-
ness in his right arm, and plaintiff has suffered 
severe shock to his nervous system and injury and 
impairment of his general health, and has suffered 
great mental and physical pain ever since said 
accident occurred, and plaintiff be~lieves, and 
therefore says, that he will never again be fully 
recovered from the injury to his right arm and 
general health as herein set forth; all to hi'S dam-
age in the sum of $12,500.00. 
VII. 
"The plaintiff, on account of said injuries, has 
been obliged to incur medical expense, and will 
be obliged to continue to do so to the extent of at 
least $350.00." 
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SECOND C.A.lTSE OF ACTION 
I. 
''Plaintiff reiterates and incorporates Para-
graphs 1 to 5 inclusive of his first cause of action. 
II . 
.. At the time of said injury to plain tiff as 
above set forth, the plaintiff was in a helpless con-
dition and unattended by any person whose duty 
it 'Yas to care for him other than the defendants 
herein, and not,vithstanding that the defendants 
and both of them knew of the helpless condition 
of plaintiff and of his injuries heretofore set out. 
and that plaintiff would probably suffer greatly 
increased bodily harm unless medical aid was 
immediately provided, the defendants and each of 
them failed and neglected to furnish this plaintiff 
any first aid or help whatsoever, but, on the con-
trary, loaded him into a truck and drove approxi-
mately eight miles to Ogden, Utah, to-wit, some 
spot on Twenty Fifth Street in said city, and let 
plaintiff out of the truck, and they did not obtain 
for him first aid or medical aid or advise the. plain-
tiff where to obtain such aid, but merely stated 
to plaintiff that they hoped he felt better in the 
morning. That the plaintiff did not receive medi-
cal aid until the following day, to-wit, July 25~ 
1951, when he was taken to the Dee Hospital in 
Ogden, Utah, after collapsing on the street. 
III. 
"The failure of the defendants to furnish 
plaintiff with first aid or medical aid caused plain-
tiff great and unusual suffering, and caused plain-
tiff's injuries to his wrist to become aggravated, 
and caused his condition of shock and nervousnes~ 
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to become more pronounced and lessened plain 
tiff's chance of complete reco~ery; all to plaintiff'~ 
damage in the sum of $7 ,500.00. 
"WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgmen1 
against the defendants and each of them as fol-
lows: 
1. On his first cause of action, for the sum of 
$12,500.00 general damages, and for reasonable 
rnedical and hospital expense incurred in the sum 
of $350.00. 
2. On hi'S second cause of action, for the sum of 
$7,500.00 damages. 
3. F·or his costs herein expended, and such 
other and further relief as the court may deem 
meet and equitable in the premises." (R. 1-4) 
The defendants filed their amended answer on Fe~b­
ruary 25, 1952, as follows: 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
"Come now the defendants in the above en-
titled action and for a1nended an'Swer to plain-
tiff's complaint herein, admit, deny and allege as 
follows: 
"As to plaintiff's First Cause of Action: 
1. Admit Paragraph 1. 
2. Answering Paragraph 2, admit that on 
the 24th day of July, 1951, the plaintiff was em-
ployed by the defendants in picking apricots upon 
the farm of the defendants at Pleasant View· in 
Weber County, Utah. Deny each and every other 
allegation set forth in Paragraph 2. 
3. Deny all of Paragraph 3. 
4. Deny Paragraph'S 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
5. Deny each and every other allegation 
set forth in plaintiff's First Cause of Action not 
herein specifically admitted. 
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•• .. A .. s to plaintiff's Second Cause of Action: 
1. Deny each and every allegation set forth 
in Paragraph 1 of plaintiff's First Cause of Action 
as reiterated and incorporated in Paragraph 1, 
except defendants admit they are residents of 
\·Veber County, lTtah and that they were owners 
and operators of a fruit farn1 in Pleasant View, 
in 'Veber County, Utah and that on the 24th day 
of July, 1951, plaintiff was employed by the de-
fendants in picking of apricots on said farm. 
2. Deny Paragraphs 2 and 3. 
3. Deny each and every other allegation set 
forth in plaintiff's Second Cause of Action not 
herein specifically admitted. 
"AS A FURTHER DEFENSE THERETO, 
the defendants allege: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
"That the First Cause of Action of plaintiff's 
complaint fails to state a claim against said de-
fendants, or either of them upon which relief can 
be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
"That the second cause of action of plaintiff's 
complaint fails to state a claim against said de-
fendants, or either of them, upon which relief can 
be granted. 
THIRD DEF'ENS.E 
"That if the plaintiff suffered any injuries 
while engaged in the employment of the defend~ 
ants, that such injuries, if any, so suffered, were 
caused solely by the carelessness and negligence 
of the plaintiff and not cause.d by the carelessness 
and negligence of these defendants. 
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F·OURTH DEFENSE 
"That the plaintiff, at the time of the alleged 
accident, did not exercise ordinary care and cau-
tion or prudence in the premises, and that the 
resulting damages and injuries, if any, complained 
of were directly and proximately contributed to 
and caused by the fault, carelessness and negli-
gence of the said plaintiff in the· premises. 
FIFTH DEFEN'SE 
"That plaintiff was, at the time of the acci-
dent, a mature man, familiar with the use of said 
ladder and of sufficient capacity and intelligence 
to appreciate danger; that said ladder, used by 
plaintiff, was then and there an ordinary tool, 
simple in construction, so that defects, if any, 
therein could be discovered without skill or knowl-
edge and without intricate inspection; that the de-
fects, if any, in said ladder could have been dis-
covered by plaintiff, who was then and there in 
possession thereof and was and had be.en using 
the same, without special skill or knowledge on the 
part of plaintiff and without intricate. inspection 
by him; that plaintiff was as well qualified as de-
fendants to detect defects, if any, in said ladder 
and to judge of the probable ¢!anger of using the 
same. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
"That plaintiff, at time of the accident, was a 
mature man, familiar with the use of said ladder 
and of sufficient capacity and intelligence to ap-
preciate danger and said ladder was then and 
there a simple and ordinary tool, the naturH of 
which is easily understood; that plaintiff had used 
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the risk of defects therein, if any there we-re. 
"WHEREFOR.E, defendants pray that the 
plaintiff take nothing by his complaint and that 
it be disn1issed, and that the defendants be 
a'varded their costs." (R. 5-7) 
That thereafter the case came on for pre-trial and the 
court took the matter under advisement, and on May 9, 
1952, made its memorandum decision as follows: 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
''This action having come on for pre-trial, 
and being taken under advisement, comes now 
the Court and grants Defendant's motion to dis-
miss and a summary judgment entered in favor of 
said defendants under rule 56 (b) see also "F" 
under said Rule. 
"Costs to Defendants. 
"This decision- is based on the pleadings and 
depositions. 
"Exhibit and Exhibit sheet filed." (R. 9) 
And on May 15, 1952, the court ente.red the following 
summary judgment: 
(Title of Court and Cause·) 
"The above-entitled cause came on regularly 
for pre-trial and hearing upon defendants' motion 
to dismiss on the 14th day of April, 1952, and for 
further argument as to law on pre-trial and de-
fendants' motion to dismiss on the 5th day of May, 
1952, in Department No. 2 of said Court, Honor-
able Charles G. Cowley, presiding, plaintiff ap-
pearing by his Attorney, Ray S. McCarty, Esquire, 
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and defendants appearing by their Attorneys, 
Samuel C. Powell, Esquire, and Derrah B. Van 
Dyke, Esquire, and it having been stipulated in 
open Court by counsel for plaintiff and defendants 
that the deposition of the plaintiff and the deposi-
tion of the defendant, Claude Alkema, heretofore 
taken, be ordered published and read and con-
sidered by the Court, and the same being there-
upon published and filed, and documentary evi-
dence and exhibits having been received in evi-
dence, and the Court having taken the matter 
under advisement, read the pleadings herein and 
read and considered said depositions herein, and 
having heard arguments of counsel for plaintiff 
and counsel for defendants, and being advised in 
the premises, and having determined that defend-
ants' motion to dismiss should be granted and to 
order that a summary judgment be entered herein 
in favor of defendants and against plaintiff pur-
suant to Rule 56(b) Utah Rules of Civil Proced-
ure: 
"NOW, THEREFORE, on the pleadings and 
depositions herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants' 
motion to dismiss be and the same is hereby 
granted. 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDG-
ED AND DECREED on said pleadings and de-
positions, that defendants have and recover and 
they are hereby given summary judgment against 
plaintiff and said action, both first and second 
causes thereof, be and the same is hereby dis-
missed. 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDG-
ED AND DECREED tha;t defendants have and 
recoveT their costs expended herein. 
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~~Dated this 13th day of l\[ay, .r\. D. 1~)5~." 
(R. 10-11) 
That thereafter, and "~ithin the time required by 
la,Y, the plaintiff appealed to the Supre1ne Court of the 
State of lTtah fron1 the court's order granting defendants' 
motion to dis1niss and granting them a sumn1ary judg-
ment against the plaintiff. 
ST.A.TEj\fENT OF· FACTS 
The court's decision and judgment was based upon 
the pleadings and the depositions, so it becomes necessary 
to determine just what facts were admitted by the plead-
ings and what facts were developed by the depositions of 
the plaintiff, Oscar Petersen, and the defendant, Claude 
Alkema. \V e will refer to the page of Claude Alkema's 
deposition as AD ________ , and Oscar Petersen's deposition 
as PD --------· 
The defendants owned and operated a fruit farm of 
approximately 30 acres at Pleasant View, near Ogden, 
Weber County, Utah, and they acquired this prope-rty in 
about the year 1935 or 1936, and this farm was planted 
in peaches, apricots, cherries and a few prunes (AD 1-3). 
The defendants furnished the ladders for th·e fruit 
pickers. They were· regular 3-legged ladders made of 
wood with seven steps. They came to a point. Five of 
them were acquired in 1951 from Olson's. They were new. 
The ladder which is involved in this case, and which 
appears in plaintiff's Exhibits A and B attached to the 
Alkema deposition, was purchased around 1945 or 1946 
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from North Ogden F·ruit Exchange. The ladders were 
stored in a steel shed at the· orchard (AD 6). 
On the 24th of July, 1951, the defendants had nine 
8-foot · ladders. The . defendant, Claude· Alkema, who 
weighs 240 pounds, claimed he was on this ladder the day 
before and that it had a leather strap on the· third back 
leg (AD 6). There is no dispute that on the early morn-
ing of July 24, 1951, the defendant, Claude .Alkema, picked 
up five men from the employment service on 26th and 
Washington Streets in Ogden for the purpose of picking 
apricots (PD 8 and .AD 3). At that time plaintiff Peter-
sen asked defendant Claude Alkema how much they were 
paying and when they were paid, and Alkema replied 
30c a bushel and they were paid every night. The five 
of them got in the light pickup truck and the defendant, 
Claude Alkema, took them out to the farm (PD 8 and .AD 
3). 
On July 24, 1951, the plaintiff was over 58 years of 
age, and weighed 155 pounds, a single man, and had 
followed mining and construction work for years. He 
had worked for Morrison-ICnudsen for between 10 and 
15 years (PD 1-4). For several years he would pick fruit 
when there was no other work to do. In the summer of 
1951 he had been picking fruit in Davis and Weber Coun-
ties (PD 4-6). For five or six years he had picked fruit 
in this manner, using regular picking ladders (PD 8). 
Defendant Claude Alkema stated that he arrived at 
the farm with the five men approximately 6 :45 a.m. That 
he told them to go down and take a row of trees and start 
picking. 
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"* * • I said, ~There's ladders there·. Find you 
a ladder and go to work.'" (.A .. D 8). 
Plaintiff Petersen said that w'hen he arrived at the farm, 
the defendant, Claude .. AJke1na, told each man to take a 
ladder and a bucket, and that he did so (PD 8). A ladder 
'vas standing by practically every tree that had not been 
finished. There 'vas a ladder in the row that was assigned 
to him and that was the ladder he picked (PD 21-22). 
The plaintiff, on being questioned whether he ex-
amined the ladder stated: 
"_.._-\.. Well, I just sat it down and shook it to 
be sure it was tight and wouldn't tip over and went 
right on up and started picking. 
"Q. Did you look at the ladder and see what 
condition it was in~ 
" .... -\.. No. They are supposed to have a ladder 
that's safe for us. 
"Q. You never examine anything you get 
on1 
"A. Yes. If it happene:d to be rickety or so, 
I'll take a look, both the ladders get loose. 
"Q. On this particular ladder, did you put 
it up to see if it was rickety~ 
"A. I just sat it down with the three legs 
and with hands like that (illustrating) and up I 
went. 
"Q. Did you examine it when you sat it up 
with both hands to see· if it was rickety~ 
"A. Yes. You do that when you set it up. 
"Q. Well, you saw it wasn't rickety~ 
"A. Yes. It wasn't rickety." (PD 9). 
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Petersen moved the ladder from tree to tree and he 
would see the ladder was set properly before he would 
go up on it. He did not observe any cracks in the ladder, 
nor did he look for them (PD 10). When he got to the 
trees he had to get almost to the last step. He knew it 
was way up high (PD 10). On this day the men were 
stripping the trees, and according to the defendant, 
Claude Alkema, the plaintiff complained of the scarcity 
of the apricots (AD 8-9). 
Defendant Claude Alkema told the men to quit about 
2:30 p.m. (AD 10). The plaintiff was on the ladder when 
nfr. Alkema told him to quit after he filled his basket. 
\Vhile plaintiff was on the last step of the ladder it broke 
and plaintiff was thrown to the ground (PD 11). 
Exhibits A and B are· pictures of the ladder and 
show the breaks in the stiles of the ladder. The defendan~ 
Claude Alkema, examined the ladder on that day and 
saw that it was broken in three places on the side rail 
(AD 12). After plaintiff fell from the ladder, he, Mr. 
Alkema, stated that the plaintiff came up to where Mr. 
Alkema was and said, "I've quit. I fell over backwards, 
and these three top steps broke out of your ladder, and 
I fell over backwards and hurt my arm." (AD 11). The 
plaintiff then asked for cold water to ba.the his arm. 
Alkema testified that he got several cans of water and 
poured on the plaintiff's arm. 
Mr. Alkema testified he had graduated from a first 
aid course in the spring of 1951 (AD 13), and that plain-
tiff had told him he was hurt and that he looked at the 
wrist but it did not appear broken to him (AD 22). That 
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he poured four or five cans of cold 'Yater on it; he knew 
that hot parks 'vould be bette-r, but there 'vere none avail-
able. He did not furnish him medical aid nor did he 
suggest that he have medical aid (AD 14-15). 
~Ir. Alkema said that "Then the plaintiff came up 
to hin1, he 'Yas shaking, and ~Ir. Alkema felt his wrist 
but could not see any breaks in it, and said the wrist was 
not swollen and that he put him and the other men in a 
truck and took them into Ogden and took the plaintiff to 
2-±th and Lincoln and let him out. The plaintiff testified 
that the reason that the defendant Alke·ma poured cold 
water on his arm is that he could not use his right arm 
himself (PD 14). That when he came into town he went 
to the Milner Hotel, that he bought some liniment for his 
arm, and that he did not get a doctor because he had no 
money (PD 14). 
That the next day he went to the employment office, 
and his hand was badly swollen, and the. next day a 
policeman took him to the Dee Hospital (PD 16). That 
Doctor Rich Johnson took care of him. 
STATEMENT OF APPELLANT'S POINTS 
I. 
The defendants were not excepted from the require-
ment that they, as employers, inspect and provide their 
employes with safe tools and appliances with which to 
work, notwithstanding the so-called "simple tool doc-
trine," and, therefore, the court erred in granting defend-
ants a summary judgment on plaintiff's first cause of 
action. 
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II. 
The defendants had the duty to provide medical 
assistance and first aid to the plaintiff, and their failure 
to do so was actionable, and, therefore, the court erred 
in granting a summary judgment to defendants on plain-
tiff's second cause of action. 
ARGUMENT 
lN'TRODUCTORY CoMMENTS 
The lower court granted defendants' motion to dis-
Bliss and ordered that a summary judgment be entered 
in favor of defendants and against the plaintiff, pursuant 
to Rule 56 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law were dis-
pensed with in the lower court. Whether or not they are 
necessary may be a moot question (see Rule 41, subdivi-
sion (b)), but their value in enabling the appellant to 
present and pinpoint the arguments in this case could not 
be over-estimated. Not having them, the writer will do 
the best he can. Of course, the appellant knows the argu-
ments presented in the lower court, and presumes that on 
the first cause of action the summary judgment was 
granted, to put it broadly, on the theory of the "simple 
· tool doctrine"; or, putting it another way, that the court 
felt that the fruit-picking ladder was an ordinary toolr 
and that the plaintiff was chargeable with knowledge 
equal to that of his employers, the defendants, of all 
obvious or discoverable defects therein. As to the second 
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cause of action, 'vhich related to the defendants' failure 
to render first aid to the plaintiff, the writer does not 
know exactly "~hy the court granted a summary judg-
ment, but will assume that the court felt that the defend-
ants were under no legal duty to render assistance or 
medical aid to the plaintiff. 
The deposition of the plaintiff, which was considered 
in this case, "'as taken by the defendants; the deposition 
of the defendant, Claude Alkema, was taken by the plain-
tiff. In both cases they were for the purpose of dis-
covery. The plaintiff has other testimony, and undoubt-
edly the defendants have other testimony and evidence~, 
and unless as a matter of law from the undisp·uted and 
agreed facts in the case the plaintiff cannot recover on 
either count, then, of course, there was a case for the jury. 
A summary judgment is authorized only where the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
where it is quite clear what the truth is and that no genu-
ine issue remains for trial. Summary judgment should 
be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to dis-
believe and which would require a directed verdict. 
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp. (1944) 
321 U. S. 620, 64 S. Ct. 724, 88 L. ed. 967. 
So long as there is any genuine issue of fact, a 
summary judgment will not be decreed. 
Bender's Federal Practice Manual, p. 333. 
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POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT EXCEPTED FROM 
THE REQUIREMENT THAT THEY, AS EMPLOYERS, IN-
SPECT AND PROVIDE THEIR EMPLOYES WITH SAFE 
TOOLS AND APPLIANCES WITH WHICH TO WORK, NOT-
WITHSTANDING THE SO-CALLED "SIMPLE TOOL DOC-
TRINE." 
The defendants owned and operated their fruit farm, 
approximately 30 acres, at Pleasant View. They depend-
ed, as one could assume from the evidence, on transient 
labor for fruit pickers, and for whom they furnished lad-
ders and other paraphernalia necessary for the job. On 
the day in question, July 24, 1951, the defendant, Claude 
Alkema, picked up these five pickers, of whom the plain-
tiff was one, early in the morning, and took them to his 
orchard. He paid by the bushel. He assigned each of 
them a row of trees to pick. There was a ladder in each 
row. There is no evidence, nor was it a fact, that the 
plaintiff had ever worked for the defendants before, or 
that he was familiar with any of the defendants' equip-
ment. 
These pickers each took a ladder. The plaintiff did 
not stop to examine the ladder. He did not have it tested. 
The defendants should have done that. This ladder was 
five or six years old. The plaintiff had a right to assume 
that he would be furnished a safe ladder, suitable for the 
work he was to do, and the defendants must know that if 
they ,permit appliances furnished employes to become 
defective, their employes are likely to suffer injury, and 
that is exactly what happened. In the afternoon, while 
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the plaintiff \Vas on the top rungs of the ladder, the 
ladder collapsed and he \vas hurled to the ground and his 
'vrist broken. 
The simple tool doctrine is well-defined in the case 
of Proctor v. Tozcn Clu.b, 105 U. 72, 141 P. (2) 156, where-
in Justice l\lcDonough quotes from Newbern v. Great 
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 4 Cir., 68 F. 2d 523, 525, 91 
A.L.R. 784: 
'·'It is well settled that, while it is the duty 
of the master, in exercise of reasonable care for 
the safety of the employee, to see that machinery 
and appliances which may cause injury to him are 
in reasonably safe condition, this duty does not 
ordinarily exist with respect to simple tools from 
the use of which no danger is reasonably to be 
apprehended or as to which the employee is in a 
better position than the master to discover defects. 
(Cases cited.) This is true, not because the em-
ployee assumes the risk of injury from defects 
in such tools, but because the possibility of injury 
is so remote as not to impose upon the master the 
duty of seeing that they are free from defects in 
the first instance or of inspecting them thereafter. 
The fact that the employee has better opportunity 
than the master to judge of the defects of such 
tools, that no inspection is necessary to discover 
such defects, and that no danger is to be appre-
hended which the employee cannot guard himself 
against, renders it unnecessary in ordinary cases 
that the master exercise with respect to simple 
tools the care that the law requires with respect 
to more complicated machinery. * * *' " 
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The case of Etel v. Grubb et ux (Sup. Ct. Wash., 
June 10, 1930), 288 P. 931, held that a 10-foot step-ladder 
supported by a tongue, used by a fruit picker, is not a 
si1nple tool within the simple tool doctrine. In this case, 
the court quoted from Pacific Telephone & Telegraph 
Co. v. Starr, 206 F. 157, 162, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1123: 
" 'The workman assumes those risks of danger 
which are ordinarily incident to the work in which 
he is engaged, and those which are open and ob-
vious to the senses, and which are known to him, 
if he continues in the occupation. He assumes 
none that may arise from latent defects in ap-
pliances not apparent from casual observation, 
which appliances it is the duty of the master to 
furnish, and to exercise reasonable care with refer-
ence to their selection.' " 
In the instant case there were no glaring, open and 
obvious defects that would put the plaintiff on notice 
that he should not use the ladder. The defects were latent 
and should have been discovered by the defendants, had 
they properly tested and inspected the ladder. 
In the case of Olson v. Kem Temple, Ancient Arabie 
Order of the Mystic Shrine (S.up. Ct., North Dakota, June 
17, 1950), 43 NW (2) 385, the majority opinion held that 
where a member of a fraternal organization volunteered 
to assist in decorating a pavilion for use of the organiza-
tion and was injured in fall from a loose step of the step-
ladder provided for his use by the organization which had 
no knowledge of such defect, the organization was not 
liable, since the stepladder was a simple tool or appliance 
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'vhich the parties had equal opportunity and ability to 
inspect. 
The dissenting opinion in this case, by Justice Chris-
tianson, seen1s to haYe grasped the real philosophy of the 
simple tool doctrine. This case quoted from Corpus Juris 
·secundum, on page 393 of the dissenting opinion: 
h 'Broadly stated, it is the (positive) duty of 
a master to furnish his servant with suitable and 
safe instrumentalities wherewith, and places 
wherein, to do his work.' 56 C.J.S., Master and 
Servant, Sec. 201, p. 900. 
" 'It is actionable negligence on the part of a 
master to fail to furnish, or to fail to exe-rcise 
ordinary or reasonable care to furnish, his servant 
with such proper tools and appliances as may be 
required for the reasonably safe prosecution of 
the work.' 56 C.J.S., Master and Servant, Sec. 
205, p. 912." 
Justice Christianson then goes on and gives the sum-
lnarization by Labatt in his work on Master and Servant: 
(p. 394) "'It is submitted that, as has been indi-
cated above, it is illogical and unreasonable to say 
that the master is free from the obligation of using 
ordinary care merely because the appliance to be 
furnished is a simple tool, but the better view is 
that the appliance being a simple tool, and entirely 
understood by the servant, the latter's obligations 
to ·his master and to himself are increased; and 
cases involving injuries from simple tools furnish 
a broader scope for the application of the various 
affirmative defenses which are ordinarily avail-
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able to the master.' 3 Labatt's Master and Servant, 
2d Ed., Sec. 924a, pp. 2476-2484." 
Both parties in the lower court depended a great deal 
upon our own Utah case of Proctor v. Town Club, supra. 
Justice McDonough ably discussed the simple tool doc-
trine and assembled the various cases and annotations 
dealing with that question. He quoted from Labatt on 
Master and Servant, supra, as quoted by Justice Frick 
in Russell v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 53 U. 457,174 
P. 663, on page 159 of the Pacific citation of the Proctor 
case. Continuing with the Proctor case on page 159, 
Justice McDonough said: 
"Nevertheless, we may assume for the pur-
poses of this case, without so deciding, that as to a 
simple as well as to a more complex tool or in-
strumentality, a master who furnishes to his work-
men regularly employed, such tool as an incident 
of his regular business, has the duty of prudently 
inspecting it or be liable for injuries resulting 
from defects which inspection would have re-
vealed; unless the servant has ·knowledge of such 
defect and is aware of and appreciates the dangers 
arising from its use, or unless the defect and 
danger are so open and obvious that an ordinarily 
prudent person would have observed and appre-
ciated them." 
In Fisher v. M-K Express Co. (Mo. App., 1942), 158 
SW {2) 458, it is stated: 
"Mere knowledge of the danger of a place 
to work or of the appliances on the part of the 
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servant will not defeat an action for personal in-
juries suffered by the serYant unless the danger is 
so glaring, open and obvious as to threaten inl-
mediate and almost certain injury or unle'Ss the 
danger is so glaring, open and ~bvious that a man 
of ordinary prudence would not attempt to oc-
cupy or use the place or appliances." 
The case of JJ oran i'. Zenith Oil Co. (Dist. Ct. of 
.A.pp., 2d Dist., Div. 2, Calif., June 7, 1949), 206 P(2) 679, 
aptly states the rule as to latent defects in equipment. 
The court said on page 681 : 
"When the occupant of land knowingly per-
mits a person to enter the premises for the pur-
pose of performing acts which the workman has 
been employed to do, the proprietor is obliged to 
exercise reasonable care for the protection of the 
toiler. He must supply a reasonably safe place in 
which the work is to be done and must furnish and 
maintain such tools and appliances as are· neces-
sary and reasonably safe for use in the operations. 
A laborer so employed is chargeable with neither. 
a concealed nor a latent defect in the equipment 
supplied. In the event he is injured as a result 
of a latent defect in the instrumentalities fur-
nished him of which he is ignorant, he may re-
cover damages for resulting injuries, if it is.shown 
that the employer, licensor or proprietor knew or 
by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
known of the defect and has failed to effect a 
repair thereof or to warn the workman. Miller 
v. Pacific Constructors, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 2d 529, 
545, 157 P. 2d 57." 
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Our court, as recently as this year, in the case of 
Reynolds v. American Foundry & Machine Co., ------ Utah 
------, 239 I) (2) 209, at page 210,. subscribed to the doctrine 
set out in the Restatement of Torts, paragraph 392: 
"Chattel Dangerous F'or Intended Use. One 
who supplies to another, directly or through a 
third person, a chattel to be used for the supplier's 
business purposes is subject to liability to those 
for whose use the chattel is supplied, or to those 
whom he should expect to be in the vicinity of its 
probable use, for bodily harm caused by the use 
of the chattel in the manner for which and by per-
sons for whose use the chattel is supplied: 
" (a) * * * 
"(b) if the supplier's failure to give to those 
whom he should expect to use the chattel the in-
formation required by the rule stated in para-
graph 388 is due to his failure to exercise reason-
able care to discover its dangerous character or 
condition." 
In this case the defendants hauled the employes to 
their farm by truck. They assigned each picker a row of 
trees to strip of the fruit. At each row there was a ladder . 
. That was the ladder to be used by the picker for that row. 
Each of these pickers, including the plaintiff, had a right 
to assume and expect that his ladder was safe and fit for 
the use intended. These pickers should not be expected 
on their own time to minutely inspect each ladder. That 
duty rested on the defendants. The defendants knew that 
ladders, like all tools in constant use, must eventually 
become defective and unsafe for use. The ladder in ques-
tion had been used for five or six ye-ars, and the· defend-
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Therefore, they had the duty of regularly inspecting these 
ladders, and if a different rrew can1e each day to pick, 
each ladder should have been inspected either at the end 
of each day's \York or in the morning before the work 
began. lT nder the better reasoned cases definitely this 
ladder \Yas not \Yhat "'"ould be considered a simple tool, 
and even if it \Yere, under the circumstances as exist in 
the case the defendants \Yould still not be relieved from 
inspecting and providing the plaintiff with a safe ladder. 
If the plaintiff had been assigned a ladder and he 
used the same ladder day after day, that might change 
the picture somewhat, and if, as in the Proctor v. Town 
Club case, the ladder \vas not used as a part of the de-
fendants' business but \vas merely loaned to the plaintiff 
as an accommodation, the answer might be different, or 
if the defects in the ladder had been so glaring and ob-
vious that the plaintiff could not have helped but see· them 
and he persisted in using the ladder and was injured, then 
again he could not recover. But none of those conditions 
existed in the instant case. This case came squarely under 
Justice McDonough's statement in the Proctor v. Town 
Club ease, supra, on page 22 of this brief. 
By the authority of Proctor v. Town Club alone, the 
court's order granting defendants a summary judgment 
on the first cause of action should be reversed. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANTS HAD THE DUTY TO PROVIDE 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AND FIRST AID TO THE PLAIN-
TIFF, AND THEIR FAILURE TO DO SO WAS ACTIONABLE. 
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The plaintiff suffered grievous injuries caused by the 
collapse and falling of the ladder furnished by the de-
fendants. He was seven or eight miles from town. He 
was unattended by any friend whose duty it was to take 
care of him, other than the defendants. The defendants 
kne·w of his helpless and pitiable condition. The defend-
ant, Claude Alkema, had graduated from a first aid 
course in the spring of 1951, yet all he did to aid this 
suffering plaintiff was to pour four or five cans of cold 
water on his wrist. He not only failed to furnish him 
medical aid, but did not even suggest that he seek it. 
The defendant, Claude Alkema, put the plaintiff and the 
other men in a truck and took them to Ogden, where he 
let them off on 24th and Lincoln Streets. Being fully 
aware of the plaintiff's condition, he did not give him any 
first aid, did not take him to a physician, or even take 
him to the vicinity of a hospital. He made no effort to 
put medical care and assistance during this emergency 
within the reach of this injured employe. 
In the case of Szabo v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (N.J., 
Jan. 4, 1945), 40 A tl. ( 2) 562, on page 563, the court 
said: 
"It is conceded that in this and other jurisdic-
tions the law is, that in the absence of a contract or 
a statute, there rests no duty upon an employer to 
provide medical service or other means of cure to 
an ill, diseased or injured employee, even though it 
result from the negligence of the master, Koviacs 
v. Edison Portland Cement Company, 128 A. 542, 
3 N.J. Misc. 368; 39 C.J. 240, sec. 348. 
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"In our judgment there is a sound and wise 
exception to this rule, founded upon humane in-
stincts. 
··That exception is, that where one engaged 
in the work of his master receives injuries, 
'vhether or not due to the negligence of the mastHr, 
rendering him helpless to provide for his own 
care, dictates of humanity, duty and fair dealing 
require that the master put in the reach of such 
stricken employee such medical care and other 
assistance as the emergency, thus created, may in 
reason require, so that the stricken employee may 
have his life saved or may avoid further bodily 
harm. This duty arises out of strict necessity 
and urgent exigency. It arises with the emergency 
and expires with it. 
"This precept probably had its inception in 
the code of moral conduct, but, like many others, 
such as furnishing the employee with a safe place 
in which to work, and proper tools with which to 
labor, has become a legal duty incorporated in 
every contract of hiring, by legal inference, not-
withstanding a lack of specific provision or statu-
tory requirement. * * * (citing cases)" 
See also : 56 C.J .S. 815, Sec. 162; 212 SW 345; 
35 Am. Juris. 537-538, See. 109. 
The defendant, Claude Alkema, could at least have 
taken this man to some doctor's office or even the emer-
gency hospital if he wished to avoid the expense or the 
embarrassment of asking a doctor to give free treatment 
for one of his injured employes, but in this case, he de-
liberately abandoned this stricken man on the streets of 
Ogden, knowing that he could not take care of himself. 
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The facts in this case come squarely within the above 
rule, where the master is obliged to give emergency 
treatment to his injured employe. As in Point I, the facts 
are such that it is clearly a question for the jury to decide, 
and the court definitely erred in granting defendants' 
motion for a summary judgment on this second cause of 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the plaintiff contends that the court's 
order of summary judgment was contrary to law and 
unsupported by the evidence. 
The court, in granting a summary judgment, was 
bound to look at the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff; however, if the lower court had viewed 
the evidence most favorable to the defendants, he still, 
under the law as set forth in the cases, and especially 
the Utah case of Proctor v. Town Club, supra, would not 
have been justified in granting the summary 'judgment 
on the first cause of action. 
The facts in the second cause of action come squarely 
within that rule of law that holds that when an employe, 
while engaged in the line of his duty, is rendered help-
less, the dictates of humanity, duty and fair dealing de-
mand that the employer furnish medical assistance. 
Therefore, the judgment of the lower court should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY S. McCARTY 
Attorney for plaitntiff and 
app-ellant. 
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